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Abstract 
We describe challenges in the risk 
management of smart card based electronic 
cash industry and describe a method to 
evaluate the effectiveness of distributed 
intelligence on the smart card. More 
specifically, we discuss the evaluation of 
distributed intelligence function called "on­
chip risk management" of the smart card for 
the global electronic cash payment application 
using micro dynamic simulation. Handling of 
uncertainty related to future economic 
environment, various potential counterfeit 
attack scenarios, requires simulation of such 
environment to evaluate on-chip performance. 
Creation of realistic simulation of electronic 
cash economy, transaction environment, 
consumers, merchants, banks are challenge 
themselves. In addition, we shows examples 
of detection capability of off-chip, host based 
counterfeit detection systems based on the 
micro dynamic simulation model generated 
data set. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The smart card market is expanding rapidly as a result 
of its superior security, reliability, and capacity. Its 
ability to carry intelligent applications on the card such 
as "access", "credit/debit", "electronic cash", etc. gives 
the smart card an expanding market. The smart card 
provides distributed processing power, a computer in 
your wallet. 
Smart card has effective card authentication and 
verification methodologies, employing cryptographic 
techniques. Smart card can be authenticated in one of 
two ways either Static or Dynamic: 
1. Using Static authentication the smart card sends the 
terminal a "digital signature" containing 
information which uniquely identifies the card e.g., 
card serial number, manufacture ID and 
manufacture date. The terminal will decrypt the 
signature to determine if the card is genuine 
2. Using Dynamic authentication the terminal will 
generate some random data, known as seed, and 
will ask the smartcard to encrypt the data. On 
receipt of the encrypted data the terminal will 
decrypt the data. If the decrypted data is the same 
as the seed then the card is genuine. Dynamic 
authentication is only possible with smartcards due 
to their ability to perform cryptography. 
As card industries move from magnetic strip cards to 
smart cards, ability to process information on the cards 
drastically increases. In the case of magnetic strip card, 
it is imperative to rely on the host system's intelligence 
to authorize the transactions (e.g., credit/debit) since it 
has no information processing capability of its own. As 
we move to smart card, the intelligence doesn't have to 
be concentrated on the host system, but it can be moved 
from the host system to more balanced combination of 
host and smart card itself. 
1.1 DISTRIBUTED INTELLIGENCE ON SMART 
CARD AS RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL 
Security and risk management are integral parts of 
development and deployment of "risk managed" smart 
card application for a global electronic cash payment 
such as Mondex electronic cash. There are three critical 
components, -- prevention, detection, and containment, 
-- to achieve balanced risk managed smart card 
application. The security is primarily concerned with 
"prevention." The risk management is primarily 
concerned with "detection" and "containment" in the 
event that the security were to be broken. The 
discussion of security can be found in [Maher, 1997]. 
The objectives of smart card electronic cash risk 
management can be summarized as follows: 
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• To contain the economic risk exposure to a 
predetermined level, and 
• To ensure the stability and continuity of the 
product. 
One of the key economic risk exposures is due to 
"counterfeit" of electronic currency. Among other 
things, the security and risk management is designed to 
address this threat head�on to minimize the impact of 
such attacks. At the same time, it is designed to ensure 
the stability and continuity of the product. 
More specifically, to accomplish smart cart electronic 
cash risk management objectives, risk management 
strategy can stand on the four pillars: 
• Prudential Risk Management 
• On-Chip Risk Management 
• Off-Chip Risk Management 
• Micro Dynamic Simulation 
Each pillar has its unique contribution to the objectives, 
but when they are balanced and combined, they become 
a formidable structure to base the risk management 
strategy, and to accomplish the objectives. It may seem 
obvious, but the prudential risk management is essential 
to the success of the product. It includes corporate 
governance and structural control. It is the foundation 
for the rest of the risk management is build onto. 
One of the fundamental strategies in smart card 
electronic cash risk management such as Mondex is to 
economically exploit the on-chip data processing power 
of the smart card to the maximum extent. By installing 
risk management functionality on a chip, some of the 
critical risk management tasks are performed at the time 
of transaction autonomously on the transacting smart 
cards. On-chip risk management functionality includes 
both on-chip detection, and on-chip incidence 
response. On-chip incidence response can be activated 
autonomously, or by the central command. 
There's a paradigm shift in off-chip (i.e., host system 
based) risk management as well. It partly relies on the 
on-chip intelligence to collect information selectively. 
At the same time, a multi-layered off-chip monitoring 
and detection capability is deployed to analyze possible 
counterfeit activities. All the on-line transactions can be 
monitored, and some of the off-line transactions are 
selectively monitored. 
Since counterfeit activities on electronic cash 
purses/cards are non-existent, Micro Dynamic 
Simulator was developed to simulate the impact of 
various counterfeit scenarios on the electronic cash 
economy for Mondex. It allows us to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the on-chip detection, the on-chip 
incidence response, and off-chip detection systems. It 
also generates data sets to create off-chip detection 
models. As we succeed in risk management, counterfeit 
transactions won't be available. The evaluation of new 
enhancement to on-chip functionality and the re­
calibration of off-chip detection models have to come 
from simulator using real market inputs. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
Mondex global electronic cash payment scheme to set 
1he stage. Section 3 discusses the distributed 
intelligence - on-chip risk management capability on 
the smart card as an example of such intelligence. 
Section 4 discusses the micro dynamic simulation. 
Section 5 discusses the quantification of impact of 
counterfeiter's threat scenarios using micro dynamic 
simulator. Section 6 discusses the effectiveness of off­
chip, host system based counterfeit detection systems. 
Section 7 summarizes the discussion. 
2 GLOBAL SMART CARD BASED 
ELECTRONIC CASH PRODUCT 
The global smart card based electronic cash product 
such as Mondex electronic cash has the security and the 
risk management to prevent, detect, contain, and 
recover from potential counterfeit activities. It is 
designed to make counterfeiter's "chain" of tasks as 
difficult as possible in every step of the way [Ezawa et 
al. 1998]. 
The product is designed for the efficient electronic cash 
payment transactions. It performs purse (chip) to purse 
(chip) transactions without central authorization. It has 
many on-chip capability and features such as physical 
security, cryptographical security, purse class structure 
(i.e., it restrict the interactions of different type of 
purses), purse limit, on-chip risk management capability 
(e.g., credit turnover limit), and migration1• Purse class 
structure, purse limit, credit turnover limit will be 
revisited in the following section. 
Figure 1 shows the Mondex transactions among the 
different classes of purses. Solid line indicates 
transactions currently allowed, and dotted line indicates 
the transactions severely restricted (or disallowed) at 
this stage of product evolution. 
Ideally, an advanced smart card based electronic cash 
scheme, as a substitute for "real" money, should parallel 
the existing money supply and banking system. 
1 It involves switching of one public key scheme to the 
other. 
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Therefore such a scheme would include a currency 
"originator" (equivalent of central bank), and 
"members" (commercial banks and other financial 
institutions with their branches). There are merchants 
who transact with consumers and members, and 
consumers transacting with other consumers, merchants, 
and members. 
Figure 1: Transactions among different class of purses 
In the following we discuss non-security related 
features: 
Chip to Chip: The value (electronic cash) is transferred 
from payer purse (chip) to payee purse (chip) without 
third party authorization. 
Purse Class Structure: It classifies purses into different 
types of purses and determines what types of purses can 
transact with each other. Each purse can transact only 
with predetermined list of purse classes. For example, a 
consumer purse which is linked to the purse holder's 
direct deposit account of the member can transact with 
other consumer purses, two types of member purses, 
and three types of merchant purses. 
Purse limits: High value limit purses (such as originator, 
and member purses) are monitored on line. All 
transactions to and from these purses are recorded and 
monitored (e.g., merchants and consumer deposit 
transactions.) Consumer purses are expected to have 
relatively low purse limits (e.g., up to $1000.) 
Credit turnover limit: An on-chip risk management 
capability to monitor amount of value being received by 
a consumer purse from non-member purses such as 
consumer to consumer, and merchant refund 
transactions. If the transaction causes the credit 
turnover limit to be exceeded, this on-chip logic 
suspends a part or whole features of the purse. The 
credit turnover limit is customized by members to fit for 
the purse holder's normal needs. 
3 DISTRIBUTED INTELLIGENCE -- ON­
CHIP RISK MANAGEMENT 
As we have already discussed, one of the fundamental 
strategies in smart card electronic cash risk management 
such as Mondex electronic cash is to economically 
exploit the on-chip data processing power of the smart 
card to the maximum extent. It allows risk management 
tasks done on the chip autonomously for each 
transaction without external intervention. 
On-chip functionality in the "security" arena has been 
around many years, but in the risk management arena it 
is a new and relatively unexplored field. In the past, an 
old generation of simple chips with a limited computing 
capability forced to rely heavily on the host systems for 
intelligence for transactions and monitoring (i.e., on-line 
transactions and authorization.) New generation of 
chips have more computing power and memory, allow 
them to have "distributed" intelligence (i.e., "intelligent 
agent") on the on-chip itself as opposed to "central" 
intelligence on the host systems somewhere in the 
network infrastructure. 
It has advantages in the effectiveness and timeliness of 
on-chip risk management functionality. It allows real­
time information gathering, monitoring & detection, and 
incidence response at the time of purse transactions. It 
also has advantage in the efficiency in data processing. 
It processes transaction data on-chip for risk 
management at the time of transaction as opposed to 
massively accumulated transaction data at host system a 
few days later 
For example, if we have 100 million cards, a distributed 
intelligent agent makes decisions for a few transactions 
a day for each card at the time of each transaction, 
whereas a central intelligent agent makes decisions for a 
few hundred million transactions a day, a few days later. 
For the central agent to make a decision, it needs a 
database of a year or two worth of these transactions. It 
is truly requires substantial investment to perform this 
task in near real-time basis. For a micro payment 
scheme, it is difficult to see the cost/benefit justification 
when we have the alternative method. 
The on-chip risk management capability is protected by 
the chip (tamper resistant). To disable its capability, it 
has to pass the layers of the security of the chip. 
One of the critical elements and advantages of the on­
chip risk management capability is that it continuously 
functions even under complete physical security 
breakdown. Yes, it is true that the risk management 
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functionality of the compromised chip will be disabled. 
But for the counterfeiters to benefit from their activities, 
i.e., to obtain economic gain, they need to interact w
_
ith 
other legitimate purses (cards) which still have ac��e 
and functioning on-chip risk management capabthty 
which are unique to each purse. Its wide range of 
functionality is discussed in the next subsection, but it is 
a formidable tasks tq pass all the screens without 
triggering some actions on the on-chip risk management 
part. 
Lastly, it is more cost effective to invest in on-chip risk 
management functionality than that of off-ch1p (host) 
risk management infrastructure to perform the same 
functionality. Although risk management must invests 
in the off-chip (host based) risk management detection, 
not to duplicate the functionality of on-chip, but to 
complement. Each has unique capability to co�tribute 
to the overall risk management. Off-chip nsk 
management discussion can be found in [Ezawa, et. al. 
1999). 
3.1 DISTRIBUTED INTELLIGENCE 
PORTFOLIO- ON-CIDP RISK MANAGEMENT 
PORTFOLIO 
There are two primary methods for fraud and 
counterfeit detection in general, one measures the 
"velocity" of transactions, and the other compares 
transactions against "statistical signature" of the purse. 
It is true for both on-chip and off-chip (i.e., host system 
based) detection. The "velocity" method, which 
monitors amount and volume of transactions, is widely 
used in the telecommunications, and fmancial industries 
to monitor potential fraudulent transactions. The 
"statistical signature" method, which monitors 
transactions against the past behavioral patterns, is more 
computationally intensive and requires more 
infrastructure support. It is also widely used in 
_
the 
telecommunications and fmancial industries to mon1tor 
net bad debt as well as fraudulent transactions and 
accounts [Ezawa, 95 & 96]. 
Risk management can use both "velocity" and 
"statistical signature" methods in on-chip as well as off­
chip risk management. The "credit turnover limit" is a 
good example of "velocity" based method implemented 
as the on-chip risk management monitoring and 
detection capability. 
On-chip risk management does not rely on single 
functionality but a portfolio of on-chip functionality to 
meet the various potential counterfeit threats. There are 
five complementary components to the on-chip 
portfolio2: 
• On-Chip Information Gathering (for Detection) 
• On-chip Control 
• Ability to Target Purses (for On-Chip Response) 
• On-Chip Response 
• Security 
On-chip functionality allows risk management tasks 
done on the chip autonomously for each transaction 
without external intervention. The on-chip risk 
management capability performs the following two 
functions extremely well: 
• Early Warning of Counterfeit Activities 
• Containment of Counterfeit Activities at the point 
of transaction 
Early Warning: It provides earlies� possible warning
_ 
of 
the counterfeit activities. It prov1des such a warnmg 
even if the counterfeit activity is low (in term of 
volume.) On-chip logic can provide warning at the 
initial stage of counterfeit activities, and allow 
incidence response team to react to the counterfeit 
threat, and contain it early. The containment task will 
be easier at the early stage and less costly. 
Containment: By constraining the functionality of 
fraudulent purses, it contains/restrains the flow of 
counterfeit values to the market. Fraudulent population 
is defmed as the population who is knowingly and 
willingly buys counterfeit value at discount from 
counterfeiters and their collaborators. When 
counterfeiters and their collaborators try to use/load the 
purses to distribute counterfeit values, most of these 
fraudulent purses are quickly disabled. 
3.2 ON-CHIP INCIDENCE RESPONSE 
As we discussed, the on-chip risk management has on­
chip incident response capability in an autonomous 
mode. Alternative approach to the counterfeit 
contingency is at the chip level by a central command to 
activate on-chip incidence response on a contaminated 
segment of purses (cards.) Once it activated, it will 
function autonomously without outside intervention 
(i.e., host systems). It is the fastest way to respond to 
the potential incident. 
The central command & communication (C3) 
mechanism is based on chip to chip secure 
2 Note that in Mondex a portfolio of on-chip functionality is in 
various stages of development, some are implemented and 
deployed, and others are under evaluation and planning . . It 
will follow a natural product cycle of continual renewal of nsk 
management capability to meet the future challenges. 
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communication. It has two aspects to it. One is the 
transmission and exchange of messages, and the other is 
the conduit and storage of information on the smart 
card. The primary task of C3 is to change the 
parameters on the purse, on-chip risk managem�t, and 
security renewal remotely and securely by sending an 
authenticated system message. 
3.3 CENTRAL COMMAND & 
COMMUNICATION (C3): 
1. Provides ability to send authenticated 
system message transmission to other 
contacting purses 
2. Allow dynamic re-customization of on­
chip risk management parameters if 
required when the purse contact with 
other purses (e.g., consumer purses) 
3. Facilitate the targeting on-chip response 
to specified segment of purses 
4. Provide ability to reset on-chip 
parameters (e.g., by member purses) 
5. Facilitate loading I unloading of purse 
related pay loads (purse upgrades, 
security renewal, etc.) 
4 MICRO DYNAMIC SIMULATOR 
To quantify a threat scenario, one needs to observe or 
model, the following phases: I) Creation of counterfeit 
value, 2) Interaction of electronic purses (trans�ctions), 
3) Diffusion of both legitimate and counterfeit value 
throughout the economy, and 4) Incident responses 
(countermeasures). 
Micro Dynamic Simulator (simulator for short) is a 
particular application of the micro dynamic simulation 
concept to the electronic cash scheme. The model's 
design is flexible enough to reflect not just today's but 
also other possible future scheme structures. The 
simulator was used to assess the effectiveness of the 
selected responses against the likely threats. 
The task to quantify a threat scenario requires, among 
other information, data on individual purses' 
transactions as well as on the effectiveness of the on­
chip based response. Therefore we use the micro 
dynamic simulation model. In general, it is a computer 
model that imitates the dynamics of the electronic cash 
scheme. It has the following important features: 1) 
Mimics the expected longer term evolution of the 
electronic cash scheme, 2) Reflects, through respective 
model parameters, short term behavioral patterns, e.g. 
seasonal fluctuations, 3) Follows the transaction 
behavior of individual purses, e.g. a number and 
frequency of transactions, and 4) Keeps a complete 
record of all individual transactions. For example, 
following characteristics are simulated: 
• Three time segments (primary period (e.g., month), 
secondary (e.g., day), and tertiary-period (e.g., 
hour)) 
• Four types of transactions (deposit, 
withdrawal, purchase, consumer to consumer) 
• Active card normally distributed 
• Number of transaction by Poisson distribution 
• Amount in general Normally distributed 
• On-chip risk management on each purse. 
• Birth/Death and population growth of originators, 
members, merchants, and consumers (and 
associated purses) 
• Consumer and merchant circles 
• Number of Consumer & Merchants Normally 
distributed 
• In-Circles probability Assignment 
The features described above allow an analyst to 
perform various experiments. The essence of every 
experiment is to: I) Design a threat scenario and inject 
the related counterfeit value into the system, and 2) 
Build in and invoke during the simulation the on-chip 
and off-chip based responses. 
The attached appendix shows examples of input and 
output screens of the simulator. To increase model's 
flexibility and the level of detail, as far as the 
transaction patterns are concerned, each level of scheme 
participants can be further segmented. Segments within 
the same level of participants differ from each other by 
their respective transaction patterns, as defmed, for 
instance, by number and type of daily transactions. 
Figure 2 shows the main screen of Mondex Micro 
Dynamic Simulator. In this simulation model, there are 
2 member bank segments (one bank segments and one 
counterfeit bank segment). There are three consumer 
segments (consumer, fraudulent consumer, and 
counterfeiter). There are two merchant segments. 
"Simulator" node allows us to defme the simulation 
property, such as duration, starting date, etc. "MXICA" 
represents "Certificate Authority" node, and allows us 
to send C3 commands, ''value creation", etc. 
"Originator" node controls the circulation of the 
currency in the simulated territory (e.g., country). 
Figure 3 in the Appendix shows a window that defmes a 
member segment given the originator. It allows the user 
to specify various characteristics of the member 
segment, ranging from, for example, member type 
(merchant bank, consumer bank, or both) to birth/death 
rates for members, merchants and consumers (i.e. 
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population growth and decline.) Member segments can 
be declared as counterfeit segments by clicking the 
corresponding "counterfeit" check box. Note that, at 
the purse level, the simulator keeps tracks of individual 
purse setting such as purse limit, value balance and on­
chip risk management functionality. 
An ability to produce and analyze multiple runs of the 
simulator model under· different scenarios allows the 
user to experience the management of the electronic 
cash economy before the scheme is actually rolled out. 
The risk management capabilities need to be 
continuously upgraded to match new potential threats in 
the rapidly evolving electronic commerce. The 
simulator model plays a critical role in the evaluation of 
both on-chip and off-chip new risk management tools to 
anticipate and prepare for the future counterfeit 
challenges. 
In addition to being a tool to evaluate the impact of 
counterfeit scenarios, the simulator model also 
generates transactions that can be used to train off-chip 
detection model( s ). The simulator model is to be 
calibrated for every respective currency originator (i.e. 
country) to reflect the particular behavior of its purse 
users and their transaction patterns of their territories. 
The simulated diffusion of the counterfeit value and an 
effectiveness with which it can be detected and 
contained provide the critical information that allows us 
to quantify a threat scenario in question. 
We briefly described the micro dynamic simulator 
under development. This simulator can provide 
quantitative information to analyze the effectiveness of 
on and off chip risk management schemes. It will be 
also useful for recruiting new members, satisfying 
fmancial authorities, as well as existing members by 
demonstrating and quantifying the security and risk 
management issues. 
5 EVALUATION 
We evaluated the above mentioned detection systems in 
the "Street Comer Counterfeit Value Distribution 
Threat Scenario" that is discussed in [Ezawa, et a/., 
1998]. This is still a preliminary result. This 
counterfeit threat scenario assumes that the 
counterfeiters will sell, at a discount, counterfeit 
electronic cash to a fraudulent population, in exchange 
for "real" local currency. The fraudulent population is 
defmed as the one that would engage in such 
transactions knowingly and willingly. The fraudulent 
population is not necessarily as loyal as agents of 
counterfeit organization and the "secret" is bound to be 
leaked to the law enforcement institutions or electronic 
cash issuing institution. 
It showed that this is quite a difficult task to carry out 
flawlessly. For the sake of the evaluation of on-chip 
risk management capability, we assumed the following: 
• Counterfeit organization has a well fmanced, well 
established world wide network, and a large 
number of dedicated agents in place. 
• It successfully broke the security of the chip I purse 
application on the smart card that required a 
complete secrecy over an extended period of time 
while various tasks are performed to break security. 
• It created a counterfeit electronic cash application -
- "shrink wrap" product of "golden goose" that can 
generate counterfeit electronic cash with flawless 
imitation of electronic cash application (e.g., 
Mondex purse) functionality. 
• It established counterfeit value distribution 
channels with no "informants". 
• Counterfeiter/agents can correctly identify 
"fraudulent" population who is willing to buy 
counterfeit values with discount. They never make 
mistakes. If they approach a normal/honest person, 
he or she might inform the fmancial institution or 
authority. 
5.1 COUNTERFEIT A'ITACK SCENARIO 
Simulation model was set to run 180 days and the 
counterfeit attack starts at the last 6 days. The length of 
the run is set so that simulation transaction data will 
provide significant amount of normal transactions. One 
the first day of the attack, April I, 1998, the 
counterfeiters inject a very small amount of counterfeit 
value to the electronic cash economy to test the system. 
On the second day, April 2, 1998, they inject amount 
they desire. On the third day, April 3, they stop their 
activities completely to observe and evaluate their 
performance of the previous day. They resume the 
counterfeit value distribution for the rest of the three 
days. Note that the calendar days are important, since 
the simulator simulates the day of the week, the 
seasonality and holiday impacts to the behaviors of 
various consumer and merchant segments. 
5.2 RESULTS 
In this section, we show the effectiveness of credit 
turnover limit only. Due to security reasons, although 
the central command based security renewal and 
dynamic re-custornization are found to be very 
effective, the discussion is omitted. 
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5.2.1 Automatic Response - Credit Turnover Limit 
Figure 4 in the Appendix shows the impact that 
counterfeit activities have on the number of locked up 
purses. This is the direct effect of the on-chip risk 
management functionality. The locked up purses are the 
legitimate ones used by fraudulent population that 
happen to be contacted by the counterfeit purses in 
order to receive the created counterfeit value. When a 
preset condition is met, the on-chip risk management 
functionality turns on on-chip response autonomously in 
this case locking up the purses. It turned out that almost 
all the fraudulent purses were locked up due to the 
credit turnover limit and forced them to visit member 
(bank) for re-customization (resetting of on-chip logic). 
Member can retrieve the information on the locked 
purse and can determine that possible counterfeit 
activities are in present. 
6 OFF-CHIP, HOST SYSTEM BASED 
COUNTERFEIT DETECTION 
Off-chip, host system based counterfeit detection 
systems complements the detection of counterfeit 
activities based on on-chip risk management capability. 
There are four monitoring systems in the Mondex 
electronic cash scheme, two (i.e., currency and member 
monitoring systems) reside in the originator monitoring 
over a country or a territory, and another two (i.e., 
merchant and consumer monitoring systems) reside in 
the issuing members (banks). In the following we 
show sample performance of two (currency and 
merchant monitoring systems) based on this attack 
scenario. 
6.1 CURRENCY MONITORING SYSTEM 
The objective of currency monitoring system is to detect 
the presence of potential counterfeit value in (almost) 
real time for the three types of attacks; rapid (i.e. a 
sudden redemption of counterfeit value), moderate, and 
long term (skimming). And to provide 
recommendations as to what steps should be taken to 
identify sources for the potential counterfeit value, once 
detected. 
The methodology of detecting the potential counterfeit 
value rests on the fact that any injection of counterfeit 
value into the Mondex economy will be eventually 
deposited with the originator and redeemed for 
"regular" money. Consequently, an unusual surge in the 
redeemed electronic cash value should be carefully 
scrutinized. 
Figure 5 shows the detection of counterfeit injection 
based on rolling monthly statistical model. As shown, it 
detects on the second day of the attack. In general, 
rolling monthly model can detect smaller counterfeit 
attack than that of daily or rolling weekly model. It of 
course takes into account the weekly, and monthly 
seasonality of the currency behavior. 
6.2 MERCHANT MONITORING SYSTEM 
The objective of the Merchant Monitoring System is to 
detect the presence of the counterfeit value in a timely 
fashion and provide decision support when the potential 
incursion of the counterfeit value is detected. 
Merchant Monitoring System primarily tracks the 
electronic cash value transactions between individual 
merchant and its acquiring member. These transactions, 
i.e., value transfer from a merchant to a member are 
fully accounted. One can also conclude that the 
merchant transaction values should be transformed in 
order to properly apply various statistical tests and 
model estimation methods. The preliminary evidence 
suggests, for instance, that the nominal transaction 
values are approximately log-normally distributed. 
Similarly to currency monitoring system, separate 
models are build to detect the three different types of 
attacks, rapid, moderate, and long term ("skimming") 
attacks that would be carried out via merchant purses 
while taking into account the length of a given merchant 
history. 
Figure 6 shows the detection of counterfeit injection 
based on rolling weekly statistical model. As shown it 
detects the out of bound condition quickly. As it turns 
out, the merchant monitoring system is a very effective 
detection system because it monitors the historic 
redemption patterns of the merchant. Even relatively 
small amount of counterfeit value spending by the 
counterfeit or fraudulent population can impact the 
merchant redemption pattern sufficiently to alarm the 
merchant monitoring system. When there is a attack, it 
causes a large number of merchants to be in the out of 
norm condition (red stars) that normal, and it gives us 
warning of potential counterfeit activities. 
Overall, both systems are very effective to detect 
material counterfeit attacks. Each system has its own 
strength and weakness, and the use of four different 
types of monitoring systems will compensate each other 
for respective weakness of the individual system. 
7 SUMMARY 
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We discussed the risk management of smart card based 
electronic cash industry and a method to evaluate the 
effectiveness of distributed intelligence function called 
"on-chip risk management" of the smart card for the 
global electronic cash payment application using micro 
dynamic simulation. We found that it is critical to 
evaluate the distributed intelligent capability 
quantitatively using micro dynamic simulation. We 
demonstrated the effectiveness of distributed 
intelligence - credit turnover limit to be very effective 
in detecting and containing counterfeit activities. We 
showed examples of detection capability of off-chip, 
host based counterfeit detection systems based on the 
micro dynamic simulation model generated data set, and 
found to be very effective. 
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Figure 3: Example Input Screen - Member Segment Specification 
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Figure 4: Example Output- On-chip Response to Counterfeit Activity 
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Figure 5: Originator Currency Monitoring System 
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Figure 6: Merchant Monitoring System 
